A couple of weeks ago, before the Thanksgiving festivities, I went up to Boston for the American Speech Language Hearing Association Convention, to present, along with Bronwyn Hemsley, Howard Shane, and Ralf Schlosser, a talk entitled “Conceptualizing and Upholding a Communication Bill of Rights for Individuals who are Minimally Speaking.” These rights, of course, include the right to evidence-based communication methodologies, as opposed to one or another variants Facilitated Communication.
While there, I attended a few other talks. One of these was
an alarmingly jam-packed talk on a fashionable new theory of language learning
known as Gestalt Language Processing. Some individuals, especially those with
autism, are purportedly a type of person known as a “gestalt language processor,”
otherwise known as GLPs. What this theory adds to the long-standing recognition
that many language-impaired individuals with autism resort to echolalia before acquiring
basic vocabulary is… unclear to me.
Except in as much as Gestalt Language Processing Theory insists
that echolalia is a building block of the language acquisition process, as
opposed to a product of associative learning that clever therapists have long tried
to shape into more meaningful communication—long before Gestalt Language Processing
proponents started telling them that that’s what they should be doing.
And except in as much as Gestalt Language Processor purportedly
means something more mystical than someone who takes a while to get beyond associative
mappings between oral patterns and situations to intentional, linguistic
communication.
But these days, we’re all about Gestalt: holistic thinking, the
Whole Child, the big picture. So Gestalt Language Processing resonates. And it’s
therefore not surprising that the two GLP talks were very well-attended—one of them even
filling up the overflow room—even though the empirical data offered up in
support of any of the various non-obvious claims was exactly zero.
Another popular presentation topic, at least as far as ASHA’s
gatekeepers were concerned, was Structured Word Inquiry. A group of SWI
proponents were awarded three different sessions. I only attended the last one,
which had been assigned to the latest time slot and therefore was not perhaps
as well attended as the others. Here I heard the usual evasions regarding how
exactly SWI’s trademark learning tasks—morphological analysis and
investigations via etymological dictionaries—help novice readers decode basic words
like “cat” and “mat”, as well as the usual confusion of decoding skills with
encoding skills (spelling), and the usual failure to explain what exactly students
get out of using word matrices to “build words.” Taking words apart may help understand
their meanings, but what does building words up do?
I was tempted to ask two questions, but refrained:
1.
Why does SWI make a distinction that no one else
makes between historical roots and what it calls “bases” (such that the
historical root in “electricity” is Latin “electrum” or Greek “ēlektron”,
meaning “amber”, while the “base” of "electricity", which most people consider
its route, is “electric”) at the same time that it broadens the concept of
etymology to include stuff that no one else would include: that is, not just the
origin of words, but contemporary coincidences like the “ear” in “hear”?
2.
How does SWI’s “word sums” (re + sign + ation à resignation) handle ambiguous
words like “unlockable”?
Another overflowing talk I attended was “The Conundrum
Behind the Missing Autistic Girls: Masking, Double Empathy, and Theory of Mind.”
This talk echoed the oft-heard claim that girls are underrepresented in autism
diagnoses because they’re better at masking. While critiquing the DSM for
including Theory of Mind deficits in its latest criteria for autism (Is that
true? I’m not seeing this anywhere), it finds justification for the notion that
masking is common in autism in the following statement that is included in the DSM:
Symptoms must be present in the
early developmental period (but may not become fully manifest until social
demands exceed limited capacities or may be masked by learned strategies in
later life).
“Masked by learning strategies”, of course, is not the same
as the deliberate masking of social eccentricities in order to “pass” as “neurotypical”—the
latter sense of “mask” being that promoted by those who claim that girls are
underrepresented in autism diagnosis. The underlying assumption, to the extent
that there is a coherent, underlying
assumption, seems to be that autistic girls are more driven/able to “pass” themselves
off as typical girls than autistic boys are driven/able to pass as themselves off as typical
boys.
The talk also discussed the research on Double Empathy,
which, as I discuss in my book Students
with Autism, to the extent that it holds up at all, holds up only with high
functioning individuals who share similar interests.
The general thrust of the talk seemed to be the
increasingly popular notion that autism, for all the masking, does not
involve social deficits, but rather anxiety and an insufficient sense of “safety”
(the purported basis for the restrictive, repetitive behaviors). As evidence for
this, the presenters cited late-diagnosed women who seemed to have no trouble empathizing
with the needs of their toddlers. Hmm.
The term “presuming competence” also came up, which pretty
much tells us everything we need to know about where these people stand with
respect to disability rights and autism. As Howard Shane pointed out in our presentation,
citing Jason Travers, presuming
competence risks undermining the rights of individuals with autism, particularly
those who are minimally speaking.
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